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A distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) aack is an aack wherein multiple compromised computer systems
ood the bandwidth and/or resources of a target, such as a server, website or other network resource, and
cause a denial of service for users of the targeted resource. e ood of incoming messages, connection
requests or malformed packets to the target system forces it to slow down or even crash and shut down,
thereby denying service to legitimate users or systems. is paper presents a literature review of DDoS aacks
and the common defense mechanisms available. It also presents a literature review of the defenses for low-rate
DDoS aacks that have not been handled eectively hitherto.
1 INTRODUCTION
Although dierent researches are ghting against DDoS aacks, even today, the deployment or
development of eective methods and mechanisms of these researches cannot resist DDoS aacks.
It is a hard problem to solve because it is multifaceted. ere are multifarious ways of creating
aacks that are extremely eective. Section 2 and 3 give an overview of the classication and
types of the dierent DDoS aacks. Section 4 gives an overview of the commonly used defense
mechanisms. I am interested in working on types of aacks that so far we have not been able to
handle eectively. ese are mainly low-rate aacks and their related works are mentioned in
Section 5.
DDoS aacks possess immense threat to the current Internet community, which comprises over
3.5 billion users [28]. Figure 1 shows the year-wise growth statistics of DDoS aacks, collated from
Arbor Networks: Worldwide Infrastructure Security Report [3], Calyptix Security Blog [8], DDoS
aack on Dyn[11] in 2016 and the largest volumetric DDoS aack, ever recorded, on Github [12].
e 2016 Dyn cyberaack[11], that took place on October 21, 2016 included multiple DDoS aacks
targeting systems operated by Domain Name System (DNS) provider Dyn. It caused major Internet
platforms and services to be unavailable to a large number of users spread across Europe and North
America. And the magnitude of these aacks peaked to 1.2 Tbps.
e Github DDoS aack[12] generated a ood of internet trac that peaked at 1.35Tbps, making
it the largest on record. Interestingly, no botnets were involved in this aack. Instead, the hackers
went with an amplication aack. ey spoofed GitHub’s IP address, and sent queries to several
memcached servers that are typically used to speed up database-driven sites. e memcached
systems then sent amplied responses from those requests to GitHub.
A computer or networked device under the control of an intruder is known as a bot. In general, in
a DDoS aack, an aacker begins by exploiting a vulnerability in a computer system, making it the
DDoS master bot. e aack master system identies other vulnerable systems and gains control
over them by either infecting the systems with malware or through bypassing the authentication
controls. ese systems are called DDoS slave bots. e aacker creates a command-and-control
server to command the network of bots, referred to as a botnet.[25] en, the aacker uses the
trac generated by the compromised devices to inundate the target so as to get its services down.
Figure 2 represents a typical DDoS architecture [14].
Also, the aackers aim that the DDoS aack packets do not reveal any obvious characteristic
to segregate malicious and legitimate trac. With minimal eort, the aackers aim to create the
maximum-possible catastrophic impact.
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Fig. 1. Growth in DDoS Volume over the years
Fig. 2. DDoS Aack Architecture
e reasons or motivations behind DDoS aacks can be specic. But, in general, the major
causes for DDoS aacks are as follows:
(1) Competition: DDoS aacks can be intended to cripple company operations, damage repu-
tation and devastate sales, which may directly benet competitors.
(2) Financial Gains: DDoS aacks can be used to achieve nancial gains. Aackers can be
hired, paid well or can even ask for ransom.
(3) Politics: DDoS aacks have the potential to digitally silence opposition parties. ey can
be used by political parties and terrorists.
(4) Revenge: Current employees, ex-employees, angry customers or anyone with a dispute
may have a motive for a DDoS aack.
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Fig. 3. Classification of DDoS Aacks
2 CLASSIFICATION OF DDOS ATTACKS
ere are a wide variety of possible DDoS aacks. And it is challenging to represent all of them
with a single classication. Dierent literatures have classied DDoS aacks in dierent ways
[17, 27, 34, 43]. Arbor networks have classied DDoS aacks as volumetric aacks and application
layer aacks. Volumetric aacks send a huge amount of trac, or request packets, to a targeted
network so as to overwhelm its bandwidth capabilities. Typically request sizes are in the 100’s
of Gbps. However, recent aacks have scaled to over 1Tbps. Application-layer aacks generally
require a lot less packets and bandwidth to get a website down. ey are silent and small, when
compared to network-layer aacks, but extremely disruptive.
Reference [27] presents the taxonomy of DDoS aacks and the dierent classications include
degree of automation, exploited weaknesses to deny service, source address validity, aack rate
dynamics, possibility of characterization, persistence of agent set, victim type and impact on victim.
Reference [34] portrays a taxonomy of a few major DDoS aacks, shown in Figure 3. It includes
two major classes of DDoS aacks: bandwidth depletion and resource depletion aacks. Bandwidth
depletion aacks ood the victim network with undesired trac, preventing legitimate trac from
reaching the victim. And resource depletion aacks tie up the resources of a victim system making
the victim unable to process legitimate requests.
3 DIFFERENT DDOS ATTACKS
e dierent DDoS aacks are enumerated below:
3.1 Volumetric DDoS Aacks
e volumetric DDoS aacks generate huge volumes of aack request or response trac, usually
measured in Gigabits per second (Gbps). e concept of a volumetric aack is simple, which is
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to send as much trac as possible to a site to overwhelm its bandwidth. Some of the well known
volumetric DDoS aacks are as follows:
(1) DNS Amplication Aack: A DNS amplication aack is a DDoS aack in which the
aacker exploits vulnerabilities in domain name system (DNS) servers to turn initially
small queries into much larger payloads, which are used to bring down the victims servers.
It is a reection aack that manipulates publicly-accessible domain name systems, making
them ood a target with large quantities of UDP packets. Using various amplication
techniques, perpetrators can inate the size of these UDP packets, making the aack so
potent as to bring down even the most robust Internet infrastructure.
(2) CharGEN Amplication Aack: A CharGEN amplication aack is usually carried out by
sending small packets carrying a spoofed IP address of the target to the internet enabled
devices running CharGEN. ese spoofed requests to such devices are then used to send
UDP oods as responses from these devices to the target. Internet-enabled printers and
copiers have this protocol enabled by default and can be used to execute a CharGEN
aack. is can be used to ood a target with UDP packets on port number 19. e server
eventually exhausts its resources and goes down.
(3) SNMP Amplication Aack: Simple Network Management Protocol(SNMP) is used for
network management. SNMP amplication aack is carried out by sending small packets
carrying spoofed IP address of the target to the internet enabled devices running SNMP.
ese spoofed requests to such devices are then used to send UDP oods as responses from
these devices to the target. However, amplication eect in SNMP can be greater when
compared with CHARGEN and DNS aacks. When the target tries to make sense of this
ood of requests, it will end up exhausting its resources and will go down.
(4) NTP Amplication Aack: Network Time Protocol(NTP) is used to synchronize the clocks
of computers to some time reference. e NTP protocol is another publicly accessible
network protocol. NTP amplication is essentially a reection aack. Reection aacks
involve eliciting a response from a server to a spoofed IP address. e aacker sends a
packet with a forged IP address, which belongs to the victim and the server replies to this
address. e response is considerably larger than the request, amplifying the amount of
trac directed at the target server and ultimately leading to a degradation of service for
legitimate requests.
(5) SSDP Amplication Aack: e Simple Service Discovery Protocol(SSDP) is based on the
Internet Protocol Suite for advertisement and discovery of network services and presence
information. SSDP allows universal plug and play devices to send and receive information
using UDP on port number 1900. SSDP is aractive to DDoS aackers because of its open
state that allows spoong and amplication. e aacker conducts a scan looking for
plug-and-play devices that can be utilized as amplication factors. As the aacker discovers
networked devices, they create a list of all the devices that respond. e aacker creates a
UDP packet with the spoofed IP address of the targeted victim. e aacker then uses a
botnet to send a spoofed discovery packet to each plug-and-play device with a request for
as much data as possible by seing certain ags, specically ssdp:rootdevice or ssdp:all. As
a result, each device will send a reply to the targeted victim with huge response. e target
then receives a large volume of trac from all the devices and becomes overwhelmed and
results in denial-of-service to legitimate trac.
(6) UDP Flood Aack: User Datagram Protocol(UDP) is a connectionless protocol that uses
datagrams embedded in IP packets for communication without creating a session between
two devices. In a UDP Flood aack, a lot of UDP packets are sent to either random or
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specic ports on the victim system. In order to determine the requested application, the
victim system processes the incoming data. In case of absence of the requested application
on the requested port, the victim system sends a ”Destination unreachable” message to the
sender. Also, to conceal the identity, the aacker oen spoofs the source IP address of the
aacking packets. UDP ood aacks oen deplete the bandwidth of network around the
victim’s system. ereby, the systems close to the victim are also impacted due to the UDP
ooding aack.
3.2 Protocol Aacks
An internet protocol is basically a discrete set of rules to exchange information on the internet.
ese rules can be exploited by a bad actor. Some of the well known protocol aacks are as follows:
(1) TCP SYN Flood Aack: e Transmission Control Protocol(TCP) SYN Flood aack is a
DDoS aack that exploits the design of the three way TCP communication process between
a client, host, and server. First, a client initiates a new session by sending a SYN packet
to the server. e server responds with a SYNACK packet and then the client sends an
ACK packet to the server before a connection is established. In a SYN ood aack, the
aacker sends repeated SYN packets to every port on the targeted server, oen using fake
IP addresses. e server, unaware of the aack, receives multiple, apparently legitimate
looking requests to establish communication. It responds to each of these with a SYN-ACK
packet from each open port. Before the connection can time out, another SYN packet
arrives. is leaves an increasingly large number of half-open connections. Ultimately, the
servers connection overow tables get ooded and the service to legitimate clients are
denied. Finally, the server may even malfunction or crash.
(2) TCP SYN-ACK Flood Aack: e second step of the three-way TCP communication process
is exploited by this DDoS aack. In a TCP SYN-ACK DDoS aack, aackers send spoofed
SYN packets to a large numbers of servers and proxies on the Internet that generate large
numbers of SYN-ACK packets in response to incoming SYN requests from the spoofed
aackers. is SYN-ACK ood is not directed back to the botnet, but instead, is directed
back to victims network and oen exhausts the victims rewalls by forcing state-table
lookups for every incoming SYN-ACK packet. is denial of service aack can render
stateful devices inoperable and can also consume excessive amounts of resources on routers,
servers and IPS/IDS devices.
(3) PUSH+ACK Flood Aack: When connecting with a server, the client can ask for conrma-
tion that the information was received by seing the ACK ag, or it can force the server
to process the information in the packet by seing the PUSH ag. Both requests require
the server to do more work than with other types of requests. By ooding a server with
spurious PUSH and ACK requests, an aacker can prevent the server from responding to
valid trac.
(4) RST/FIN Flood Aack: Aer a successful three or four-way TCP-SYN session, RST or FIN
packets are exchanged by servers to close the TCP-SYN session between a host and a client
machine. In an RST or FIN Flood aack, a target server receives a large number of spoofed
RST or FIN packets that do not belong to any session on the target server. is aack tries
to exhaust a servers resources as the server tries to process these invalid requests. e
result is a server unavailable to process legitimate requests due to resources exhaustion.
(5) IGMP Flood Aack: Internet Group Management Protocol(IGMP) is yet another connec-
tionless protocol, used by IP hosts to report or leave their multicast group memberships for
adjacent routers. An IGMP ood aack involves a large number of IGMP message reports
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being sent to a network or router, signicantly slowing down and eventually preventing
legitimate trac from being transmied across the target network.
(6) ICMP Flood Aack/Ping Flood Aack: Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is another
connectionless protocol used for IP operations, diagnostics, and errors. Just as with a UDP
ood, an ICMP ood does not rely on any specic vulnerability to achieve denial-of-service.
An ICMP ood aack can involve an ICMP echo request. Once enough ICMP trac is sent
to a target server, it gets overwhelmed with requests, resulting in a denial-of-service.
(7) Multi-Vector Aack: Aackers can also combine more than one DDoS aack mechanisms
to re DDoS aacks keeping the engineers dealing with the DDoS aack confused. ese
aacks are the hard to discern and are capable of taking down some of the best-protected
servers and networks. For example, HTTP Flood Aack can be combined with Recursive
HTTP GET Flood Aack and red together.
(8) DNS Flood Aack: In a Domain Name System(DNS) ood aack, the aacker targets one or
more DNS servers belonging to a given zone, aempting to hamper resolution of resource
records of that zone and its sub-zones. DNS servers help requesters nd the servers they
seek. A DNS zone is a distinct portion of the domain name space in the Domain Name
System. e administrative responsibility is delegated to a single server cluster for each
zone. In a DNS ood aack the oender tries to overbear DNS servers with apparently valid
trac, overwhelming server resources and impeding the servers’ ability to direct legitimate
requests to zone resources. e aacker sends multiple DNS requests to the victims DNS
server directly or via a botnet. e DNS servers become ooded with requests,cannot
process all of its incoming requests, eventually crashes.
(9) Smurf Aack: e Smurf aack is a DDoS aack in which a large number of ICMP packets
with the intended victim’s spoofed source IP are broadcast to a computer network using an
IP broadcast address. Most devices on a network will, by default, respond to this by sending
a reply to the source IP address. If the number of machines on the network that receive and
respond to these packets is very large, the victim’s computer will be ooded with trac.
is can slow down the victim’s computer to the point where it becomes impossible to
work on.
(10) Fraggle Aack: A Fraggle Aack is a DDoS aack that involves sending a large amount of
spoofed UDP trac to a routers broadcast address within a network. It is very similar to
a Smurf Aack.
(11) SIP Flood Aack: e Session Initiation Protocol(SIP) ood aack is a DDoS aack that
exploits the application layer protocol SIP, used in VOIP call setup. An aack can be made
using dierent types of SIP request messages like SIP REQUEST, SIP INVITE or the SIP call
control messages like SIP INFO, SIP NOTIFY, SIP RE-INVITE. e goal of this aack is to
ood the proxy server or the SIP registration server and to consume all of its resources.
Here, any army from the botnet sends thousands of messages to the SIP registrar server
which is responsible to accept REGISTRAR requests as well as to keep records of the
addresses and parameters of the user agents, unless it receives any server error message. As
a result, the server overwhelms the legitimate users experience service outage and cannot
reach the server.
(12) IP Null Aack: Packets contain IPv4 headers which carry information about which transport
protocol is being used. When aackers set the value of this eld to zero, these packets can
bypass security measures designed to scan TCP, IP, and ICMP. When the target server tries
to put process these packets, it will eventually exhaust its resources and reboot.
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(13) HTTP Flood Aack: e real IP of the bots is used to avoid suspicion. e number of
bots used to execute the aack is same as the source IP range for this aack. Since the IP
addresses of the bots are not spoofed, there is no reason for defense mechanisms to ag
these valid HTTP requests. A bot can be used to send a large number of GET, POST or
other HTTP requests to execute an aack. Many bots can be collated in an HTTP DDoS
aack to completely cripple the target server.
(14) Single Session HTTP Flood: An aacker can exploit a loophole in HTTP 1.1 to send several
requests from a single HTTP session. is allows aackers to send a large number of
requests from a handful of sessions. In other words, aackers can bypass the limitations
imposed by DDoS defense mechanisms on the number of sessions allowed. Single Session
HTTP ood aacks target a servers resources resulting in complete system shutdown or
poor performance of the server.
(15) Single Request HTTP Flood Aack: Single request HTTP Flood aack is based on the idea
of sending several HTTP requests in a single HTTP session by masking these requests
within one HTTP packet. When defense mechanisms evolved to block multiple incoming
packets for a single session, aacks like Single Packet HTTP Flood were designed with
workarounds to defeat these defenses. is evolution of an HTTP ood exploits another
loophole in the HTTP technology. Several HTTP requests can be made by a single HTTP
session by masking these requests within one HTTP packet. Keeping packet rates within
the allowed limits, this technique allows an eective aack, exhausting a servers resources.
(16) Recursive HTTP GET Flood Aack: For an aack to be highly successful, it must remain
undetected for as long as possible. is is yet another kind of HTTP ood aack wherein
the aacker requests multiple website pages, analyses replies, and then recursively requests
each object of the website. is method can be used together with any kind of HTTP to
make the aack as unnoticeable as possible. It is hard to detect as the recursive requests of
the website objects resemble legitimate requests.
(17) Random Recursive GET Flood Aack: is aack is a purpose built variation of Recursive
GET aack. It is designed for forums, blogs and other websites that have pages in a sequence.
Like Recursive GET it also appears to be going through pages. Since page names are in
a sequence, to keep up appearance as a legitimate user, it uses random numbers from
a valid page range to send a new GET request each time. Random Recursive GET also
aims to deate its targets performance with a large number of GET requests leading to
denial-of-service for actual legitimate users.
(18) IP Packet Option Field Aack: is aack targets the optional elds of an IP packet and
randomizes its value. For example, if in an IP packet, all qualities of service bits are set
to 1, it causes the victim to apply some additional time to analyze the packet. us, it
can inundate the processing ability of the victim if a ood of packets arrives with such
deformation.
(19) Ping of Death Aack: In a ping of death aack, an aacker intentionally forms a data packet
that exceeds the maximum packet size which causes the victims to freeze or crash. is
aack can be initiated by the aacker without requiring a botnet. It is an IP fragmentation
aack that exploits the inherent size limitation that a packet can be transmied in.
(20) Teardrop Aack: In this aack, the aacker manipulates the oset value which in turn
generates errors in fragmentation and reassembly of packets. e aacker sends fragmented
packets with overlapping oset numbers. us, during the time of the packet re-assembly,
invalid packets are created and crash the targeted server.
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(21) Session Aack: To bypass defenses, instead of using spoofed IP addresses, this aack uses
the real IP address of the bots being used to carry out an aack. is aack is executed
by creating a TCP-SYN session between a bot and the target server. is session is then
stretched out until it times out by delaying the ACK packets. Session aacks try to exhaust
a server’s resources through these empty sessions. at, in turn, results in a complete
system shutdown or unacceptable system performance.
(22) UDP Fragmentation Flood Aack: It is another one of those cleverly masked DDoS aacks
that are not easily detected. e activity generated by this aack resembles valid trac
and all of it is kept within limits. is version of the UDP Flood aack sends larger
yet fragmented packets to exhaust more bandwidth by sending fewer fragmented UDP
packets.When a target server tries to put these unrelated and forged fragmented UDP
packets together, it will fail to do so. Eventually, all available resources are exhausted and
the server goes down.
(23) VoIP Flood Aack: is version of application specic UDP ood aack targets VoIP servers.
An aacker sends a large number of spoofed VoIP request packets from a very large set of
source IP. When a VoIP server is ooded with spoofed requests, it exhausts all available
resources while trying to serve the valid and invalid requests.
is reboots the server or takes a toll on the servers performance and exhausts the
available bandwidth. VoIP oods can contain xed or random source IP. Fixed source IP
address aack is not easy to detect as it masks itself and looks no dierent from legitimate
trac.
(24) ICMP Fragmentation Flood Aack: is version of ICMP Flood aack sends larger packets
to exhaust more bandwidth by sending fewer fragmented ICMP packets. When the target
server tries to put these forged fragmented ICMP packets with no correlation together, it
will fail to do so. e server eventually exhausts its resources and reboots.
3.3 Low Rate DDoS Aacks
Detection of low rate DDoS aacks is extremely hard as they possess the ability of concealing their
trac, because the trac is very much like the normal, legitimate trac. ey are able to elude the
current anomaly-based detection schemes. Some of the well known low rate DDoS aacks are as
follows:
(1) Flash-Crowd DDoS Aacks: A Flash Crowd Aack(FCA) is a DDoS aack that consumes
the resources of a targeted service with legitimate looking requests generated by numerous
bots. It is extremely hard to detect as bots may request legitimate content. An aacker may
further employ several bots, each sending requests at a low rate.
(2) TCP Shrew Aack: ese are DDoS aacks which generate periodic, short bursts of high-
volume trac and create congestion. is forces legitimate TCP connections to drastically
reduce their sending rate. Shrew aacks exploit, the deciencies in the retransmission
time-out (RTO) mechanism of TCP ows. ey throle legitimate TCP ows by periodically
sending burst pulses with high peak rate in a low frequency. As such, the TCP ows see
congestion on the aacked link every time it recovers from RTO. Indeed, such a shrew
aack may reduce the throughput of TCP applications down to almost zero.
(3) Hash Collisions DDoS Aacks: Most application servers create hash tables to index POST
session parameters and are sometimes required to manage hash collisions when similar
hash values are returned. Collision resolutions are resource intensive, as they require an
additional amount of CPU to process the requests. In Hash Collision DDoS aacks, the
aacker sends a specially craed POST message with a multitude of parameters. ese
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parameters are built in a way that causes hash collisions on the server side. is slows
down the response processing dramatically. Hash Collisions DDoS aacks are very eective
and can be launched from a single aacker computer, slowly exhausting the application
servers resources.
(4) Costly Requests Aack: ese are DDoS aacks wherein the aacker requests for content
that requires costly database queries, which deplete bandwidth and connection pool between
a front-end server and a database. e requests that involve long processing times, create a
load on database processing and consume ample amount of server resources are selected
by the aackers to launch the aack.
(5) Slowloris Aack: A Slowloris DDoS aack works by opening multiple connections to
the targeted web server. And it keeps them open as long as possible. is is achieved
by continuously sending partial HTTP requests, none of which are ever completed. e
aacked servers open more and connections open, waiting for each of the aack requests
to be completed. As the requests are not completed, the targeted servers maximum
concurrent connection pool gets lled, and additional legitimate connection aempts are
denied.
3.4 Vulnerability-Based DDoS Aacks
Servers or protocols may have are unknown or unpatched vulnerabilities. Aackers exploit these
vulnerabilities to launch aacks. Examples of vulnerability-based DDoS aacks are:
(1) Zero Day DDoS Aack: ese are DDoS aacks that exploit new vulnerabilities. ese
ZERO Day DDoS vulnerabilities do not have patches or eective defensive mechanisms at
the time of the aack.
(2) LAND Aack: A LAND(Local Area Network Denial) aack is a DDoS aack that consists
of sending a special poison spoofed packets to a computer, causing it to lock up. Whenever
a system receives this type of packets, it replies back to itself which in turn creates an
innite loop. As a result of this, the system crashes eventually.
4 DDOS MITIGATION
DDoS aacks pose immense threat to the resources of the victim and to the network bandwidth
and infrastructure. Although for each aack, or a group of aacks, described in Section 3, there are
specic defense mechanisms available in literature, some of the commonly used ways to mitigate
DDoS aacks are as follows:
(1) Hop-count ltering: A commonly used defense is hop-count ltering [19] that lters packets
that contain spoofed IP addresses. In this approach, the authors have used the concept
that it is not possible to alter the number of hops of an IP packet when it travels from
a source to a destination. erefore, the authors have used this count to determine the
validity of a packet. In this method, time to live value is used to count the number of hops.
is hop counts are stored in a mapping table against each source address. Upon receiving
a packet, the number of hops required for this packet is calculated and matched against
the mapping table. A packet is detected as spoofed packet if a mismatch is found in this
comparison. If a ow of packets is identied as a ow of spoofed packets, the lter discards
those packets as a prevention of an aack. e deployment of such a technique is easier as
it requires implementation in the victim’s system. But, it has a limitation in the process of
hop count. As this method counts the number of hops based on time to live, the number
of false positive is larger in this method. is is because the initial time to live value is
usually dierent for dierent operating systems. Additionally, the aacker can forge valid
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hop counts in their packets which allows the packets to pass the lter. Finally, for a ood
of malicious packets, the system cannot perform the calculation and comparison. Hence it
becomes the victim of the DDoS aack.
(2) Source Address Validity Enforcement protocol: Source Address Validity Enforcement (SAVE)
protocol [24] enforces the routers to send messages containing updated source information
to each destination routers connected to a source. en, each router updates its forwarding
table with current information and uses it to lter the packets based on the methods of RPF.
us, it overcomes the problem encountered in the RPF for the asymmetric and dynamic
nature of the Internet. However, implementation of such protocol requires a change in the
existing routing protocol which is a time-consuming process. Also, a partial deployment of
the protocol does not guarantee full success in ltering spoofed IP addresses.
(3) Rate Limiting: Rate limiting is one of common ways to defend the DDoS aacks. Generally,
if the results of a detection mechanism are found to be partially successful, that is, if it
produces large false negatives or cannot identify a precise distinction between the legitimate
and malicious trac, it is reasonable to apply rate limiting rather than ltering.
(4) Ingress/Egress ltering: Ingress/Egress ltering is a commonly used technique to prevent
trac with spoofed IP addresses to enter into a protected network. Basically, ingress
ltering lters the malicious trac destined to a local network and egress ltering discards
the malicious trac leaving a local network. Ingress ltering dened in RFC 226768 allows
the trac to enter the network which matches with a predened range of domain prexes
of the network. If an aacker uses spoofed IP address that do not match with the prexes,
it is discarded at the routers. us, this ltering technique ensures prevention from DDoS
aacks where spoofed IP addresses are used. However, it is not a useful mechanism in the
cases where the valid IP addresses of the botnets are used as a source IP addresses during
the aack. Also, the success of these ltering depends on the knowledge of the range
of expected IP addresses for a port which is not always achievable for the complicated
topologies used in dierent networks. Moreover, if an aacker uses some spoofed IP
addresses that fall into the valid address range, the lters in the routers cannot detect the
malicious trac in such scenarios. Also, for these lters, itunneling is required for mobile
IP users so that they are not ltered by the routers using ingress/egress ltering. Moreover,
as it does not ensure incentives to the Internet Service Providers, it is partially deployed in
the networks. Additionally, many Internet Service Providers do not enforce this approach.
(5) Load balancing: e key function of a load balancer is to spread workloads across multiple
servers to prevent overloading servers, optimize productivity, and maximize uptime. Load
balancers also add resiliency by re-routing live trac from one server to another if a
server is under a DDoS aack. erefore, load balancers help to eliminate single points
of failure and reduce the aack surface. Load Balancing is an approach which tries to
balance the loads of dierent systems so that no one system gets overloaded. e result
of the load balancing helps to gain the optimal productivity and the maximum uptime.
In order to ensure the maximum load balancing, a bandwidth increase is required on all
critical connections. A good number of replicated servers and data centers are required to
guarantee elimination of single point of failure.
(6) Martian address ltering and source address validation: Martian address ltering is dened
in RFC 1812. It works for ltering spoofed IP addresses that are generated from a limited set
of addresses. is ltering ensures that a router must not forward any packet which has an
invalid source or destination IP address. ese invalid IP addresses range from reserved or
special IP addresses as well as the unallocated range of IP addresses. Additionally, it ensures
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that any packet with the destination IP address 255.255.255.255/32 must be discarded at the
router.
Source address validation is also specied in RFC 1812 and implemented in the routers.
In this ltering mechanism, the router compares the source address of a packet with the
logical interface of the packet where it is received. If this interface does not match with
the interface where the packet needs to be destined to reach the specied source address,
the router discards the packet. us, it can lter packets with spoofed source IP addresses.
However, the rate of the false positive may become high for the asymmetric routes of the
Internet. is asymmetric nature does not guarantee the match of the interfaces upon
receiving or return of a packet from a specic source address. us, this ltering may
discard a large number of legitimate tracs. However, the essential issue here is that not
all routers in the Internet implement these approaches.
(7) Capability-based response: is mechanism can help prevent ooding related DDoS aacks.
e receiver cannot control how much trac it would receive. ere exists ow control and
congestion control mechanisms, but a misbehaving sender does not care about it. erefore,
the techniques involved in capability-based DDoS response work to discern a solution to
control such misbehaving sender. Stateless inter ow lter (SIFF)134 and trac validation
architecture (TVA)135 are two example methods of this type.
(8) Route-based Packet Filtering: Route-based Packet Filtering(RPF) lters packets with spoofed
source IP addresses. is ltering technique enhances the scope of the ingress ltering by
providing service to the core routers. It does provide ltering based on the route information
of a packet in each link of a core router. It depends on the principle that each link of the
core router accepts trac from only a limited number of source addresses. us, an IP
packet which has a dierent source address than this set of addresses is discarded by the
core routers as it appears to be spoofed to the router. In order to implement this technique,
it requires information of the Border Gateway Protocol routing topology. According to the
simulation of Park and Lee,[29] a signicant success of the technique will be achieved if
18% of the autonomous systems implement this ltering technique. However, this number
is found impractical in current Internet scenario. Additionally, in order to include the
source addresses in the BGP message, it is required to modify the scheme used in BGP
messaging. is increases the message size and processing time of the BGP messages.
Moreover, if the routers do not maintain updated information, this technique can discard
legitimate packets for unwanted root change. Also, as RPF lters packets are based on
BGP messaging information, an aacker can deceive root information and ltering rules
by stealing BGP sessions. Finally, the aacker can carefully choose IP addresses that do
not resemble the spoofed IPs. is can make the method ineective in protecting DDoS
from spoofed IP. Reference [15] extends the idea of Park and Lee[29] by designing a packet
ltering mechanism which considers update messages of local BGP to lter out spoofed IP
addresses. is method is easy to deploy on the current architecture which relies on the
BGP routing protocol. It also reduces the rate of false positive and simplies IP traceback
process.
(9) History-based ltering: History-based ltering is a packet markingbased ltering tech-
nique where the history of the normal trac is used to lter out the malicious trac[30].
Here, the destination of an aack maintains a database of IP addresses. is database
comprises IP addresses which are commonly found in the destination. erefore, when a
bandwidth aack is targeted to this system, the system only allows those IP addresses that
appear in their database and discards all other IP packets. However, this ltering technique
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cannot successfully detect and discard the malicious ow if an aacker can simulate its
aack trac as a normal trac.
(10) Path identier: e path identier method [39] eliminates packets based on a path identier
that identies the path of the aacker. Identifying the path is a deterministic approach
where each packet is stamped with an identier based on the path it has traveled. e
packets that travel the same path contain the same identier. us, if the victim can
identify a packet traveling from the aacker, it can lter all the subsequent packets sent
by the aacker. is approach works well when half of the routers get involved to mark
the packets. Because it works with a small sized identication eld, there remains the
possibility that dierent paths can show the same path information. erefore, it can give
false-positives and false-negatives. Reference [40] proposes an improved version of the
path identier approach called StackPi that improves path identier’s performance in terms
of incremental deployment. Additionally the improved ltering mechanism is capable of
identifying malicious ows based on just a single packet. As per the paper, this method
can provide a reasonable amount of DDoS protection only if 20% of the routers implement
this marking scheme. However, this method does not consider the detection of spoofed IP
address packets rather it marks and lters a malicious packet based on the deterministic
packet marking mechanism. Moreover, a host or router looking for the path information
through this method may need to have some supportive soware as well as expense of
processing making this method dicult to deploy, as mentioned in reference [4].
(11) PacketScore: PacketScore [21] is a proactive ltering technique that uses Bayes theorem to
compute conditional legitimate probability(CLP). e conditional legitimate probability
is used to determine the likelihood of a legitimate packet based on the baseline prole
value and the aribute value of a packet. e packet ltering works based on this CLP
value and a dynamic threshold. As the ltering takes into account the statistical analysis,
this method works well for new aack signatures as well as non spoofed aack tracs.
However, this method requires a large amount of storage to deal with the increasing
number of aack aributes. It introduces a DDoS defense scheme that supports automated
online aack characterizations and accurate aack packet discarding based on statistical
processing. e key idea is to prioritize a packet based on a score which estimates its
legitimacy given the aribute values it carries. Once the score of a packet is computed, this
scheme performs score-based selective packet discarding where the dropping threshold is
dynamically adjusted based on the score distribution of recent incoming packets and the
current level of system overload.
(12) Secure overlay: e idea behind secure overlay [1] is to build up an overlay network on top
of the IP network. It uses three principles: (i) enabling end-hosts to communicate without
revealing their IP address, (ii) giving end-hosts control to defend against Denial-of-Service
(DoS) aacks at the overlay level, and (iii) making sure that the added functionality does
not introduce vulnerabilities not present in the Internet. is overlay network is the entry
point for the outside network to establish a communication to the protected network. It is
assumed that the isolation can be achieved if a protected network hides its IP addresses or
uses a distributed rewall. is rewall ensures that only trusted trac from the nodes
of the overlay network can get entry to the protected network. Although this mechanism
ensures prevention from the DDoS aack, it is applicable to a private network.
(13) Honeypots: A honeypot [35] aracts aackers to aack them. erefore, the actual sys-
tem remains protected. Also, honeypots can be used to extract important information
like records of aack activity, tools, and soware used for the aack which can reveal
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information about an aacker. is information is further used to detect and mitigate a
DDoS aack. But this technique also contains some drawbacks. For example, the static and
passive nature of the honeypots do not guarantee complete concealing from the aacker.
(14) Changing IP addresses: Changing IP address technique [16] allows the computer system
changes its IP address to invalidate an old address which may be the potential target of
the DDoS aacks. is approach works for an IP address based aack. However, this
also incurs a lot of overheads such as updating dierent entry information. is method
works well till the aacker does not get informed about the new IP address. is approach
provides the technological futility of addressing the problem solely at the local level.
(15) Congestion policing: e goal of a bandwidth ooding aack is to congest the resource[13].
e impact of this type of aacks can be reduced or eliminated by applying congestion
policing mechanism. Re-feedback[6] and NetFence[26] are two example mechanisms where
congestion policing is applied to defend DDoS aacks. Re-feedback ensures metrics in data
headers such as time to live and congestion notication will arrive at each relay carrying
a truthful prediction of the remainder of their path. NetFence uses a secure congestion
policing feedback, to enable robust congestion policing inside the network.
(16) Applying security patches: It is also required to update all security patches regularly to
ensure that the system is not aected by bugs or worms. Also, in order to prevent IoT
botnets generation, it is mandatory to change the default or generic passwords of the IoT
devices.86 is is an important awareness from the users side that can ght against the
massive IoTbased DDoS aacks. However, the irony is that most of the users of the
IoT devices are not aware of the threats or even they do not know the name of the DDoS
aacks. When an aacker compromises a device for the DDoS army, the user of the device
does not notice any change in their performance or behavior. us, stealthily they help in
the aack without even knowing the name of the aack that they are participating.
5 DEFENSES FOR LOW RATE ATTACKS
Low-rate DDoS aacks are not handled eectively by the current defense mechanisms. ese
aacks have ability of concealing their trac because they are very much like normal trac. ey
have the capacity to elude the current anomaly-based detection schemes. Instead of exhausting the
network bandwidth, these aacks deny service at the device level. ey deplete the resources at
the service or the operating system, making it dicult for the device unable to process legitimate
clients’ trac. ese aacks are challenging to detect at the network level since they generate
requests at low rate. Examples of such aacks are Flash Crowd Aack, TCP Shrew Aack[22],
Slowloris Aack, Hash-Collision Aack, described in 3.3.
Instead of a generic approach, most defenses focus on just a single variant. ere is no generic
framework to handle all low-rate DDoS aacks.
Some related work for the slow aacks is as follows:
(1) Reference Architecture: Reference [33] proposes a reference architecture for defense against
low-rate DDoS aacks, enabled by a Soware Dened Infrastructure(SDI). Here, both
network and computational resources are provisioned and modied on demand to achieve
the mitigation goals. e suspicious trac is detected and redirected to the Shark Tank
system, which is created on-demand. e Shark Tank system is a separate cluster which
possesses full application capabilities designed to monitor suspicious users. e key feature
of the Shark Tank is to act as a restricted area for the aacker so that they can be placed
under close surveillance. It does absorb the damage from the DDoS aacks and allows the
system to learn from these aacks for future reference.
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(2) Collaborative Detection and Filtering: Reference [10] presents a defense by combining
discrete Fourier transform (DFT) and a hypothesis test framework to cope with shrew
aacks. By computing the autocorrelation sequence of sampled time series and converting
them into frequency-domain spectrum using DFT, the authors nd that the power spectrum
density (PSD) of a trac stream containing shrew aacks that has much higher energy
in low-frequency band than that appears in the spectrum for legitimate TCP/UDP trac
streams. Based on this distinction, we develop a distributed collaborative detection and
ltering (CDF) scheme to detect and segregate the shrew aack ows from legitimate
TCP/UDP trac ows. In addition to soware implementation, the scheme can be im-
plemented by network processor or recongurable hardware. e DSP hardware pushes
spectral analysis down to the lower packet-processing layer. If the packets are processed by
hardware and malicious ows are ltered out timely, the router workload will not increase
much in the presence of shrew aacks.
(3) Randomization on TCP Retransmission Timeout (RTO): Reference [41] proposes random-
ization on TCP RTO as defense against such aacks. With RTO randomization, an aacker
cannot predict the next TCP timeout and consequently cannot inject the burst at the exact
instant. e authors show that randomization can eectively mitigate the impact of DDoS
aacks while maintaining fairness and friendliness to other connections.
(4) HAWK: Reference [23] proposes a new stateful adaptive queue management technique
called HAWK (Halting Anomaly with Weighted choKing) which works by judiciously
identifying malicious shrew packet ows using a small ow table and dropping such
packets decisively to halt the aack such that well-behaved TCP sessions can re-gain their
bandwidth shares. e authors show that HAWK is highly agile.
(5) Shrew Aack Protection: Reference [9] presents a simple priority-tagging ltering mecha-
nism, called SAP (Shrew Aack Protection), that protects well-behaved TCP ows against
low-rate TCP-targeted Shrew aacks. In this method, a router maintains a simple set
of counters and keeps track of the drop rate for each potential victim. If the monitored
drop rates are low, all packets are treated as normal and equally compete to be admied
to the output queue and only dropped based on the AQM (Active eue Management)
policy when the output queue is almost full. However, if the drop rate for a certain victim
becomes higher than some dynamically determined threshold (called fair drop rate), the
router treats packets for this victim as high-priority, and these high-priority packets are
preferentially admied to the output queue. SAP marks victim packets as high priority
until their drop rate is below the fair drop rate. By preferentially dropping normal packets
to protect high-priority packets, SAP can prevent low rate TCP-targeted Shrew aacks
from causing a well-behaved TCP ow to lose multiple consecutive packets repeatedly.
is technique protects well-behaved TCP ows away from near zero throughput when
under an aack.
(6) Treat as application-level aacks and discern anomalies: A way of detecting low rate DDoS
aacks is to treat them as application-level aacks and look for anomalies in the payload
of the incoming service requests. is is the approach taken by DDoS defense providers
and requires costly deep-packet inspection. Reference [20] presents an investigation in
the adoption of cloud-based DDoS Protection Service providers worldwide. e authors
focus on nine leading providers according to namely Akamai, CenturyLink, CloudFlare,
DOSarrest, F5 Networks, Incapsula, Level 3, Neustar, and Verisign. e investigation is
done on the basis of long-term, active DNS measurements, which allows for a given domain
name, to verify if trac diversion towards a DDoS Protection Service is in place or not.
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(7) Feature Feature Score(FFSc): Reference [18] introduces a statistical measure called Feature
Feature Score (FFSc) for multivariate data analysis to distinguish DDoS aack trac from
normal trac. e authors extract three features of network trac, entropy of source IPs,
variation of source IPs and packet rate to analyze the behavior of network trac for aack
detection. ey build proles of these features during normal operation and detect aack
trac as the trac that deviates from these proles.
(8) New Information Metrics: Reference [37] proposes that the generalized entropy and infor-
mation distance metrics outperform the traditional Shannon entropy and KullbackLeibler
distance metrics for the low-rate DDoS aack detection in terms of early detection, lower
false positive rates, and stabilities. It proposes an eective IP traceback scheme based on an
information distance metric that can trace all aacks back to their own local area networks
(LANs) in a short time. e proposed generalized entropy metric can detect aacks several
hops earlier than the traditional Shannon metric approach. e proposed information
distance metric outperforms the popular Kullback-Leibler divergence approach as it can
enlarge the adjudication distance and then obtain the optimal detection sensitivity.
(9) Expectation of Packet Size(EPS): Reference [44] presents a measurement, expectation of
packet size, that is based on the distribution dierence of the packet size to distinguish
low-rate DDoS aacks from legitimate trac. e authors propose an expectation of packet
size measurement to distinguish aack trac from legitimate trac. e proposed method
is independent of the aack paern; therefore, it can avoid the inherent shortcomings
of the signature-based metric. Moreover, this approach can achieve a large distance gap
between the aack tracs and the legitimate tracs, which could further contribute to a
low false-positive rate.
(10) Trac Cluster Entropy: Reference [31] proposes trac cluster entropy as detection metric
not only to detect DDoS aacks but also to distinguish DDoS aacks from Flash Events.
e authors show that when ash events are triggered, source address entropy increases
but the corresponding trac cluster entropy does not increase. However, when DDoS
aack is launched, trac cluster entropy also increases along with source address entropy.
(11) E–LDAT: Reference [5] proposes ELDAT, a lightweight extendedentropy metricbased
system for both DDoS ooding aack detection and IP traceback. It aims to identify DDoS
aacks eectively by measuring the metric dierence between legitimate trac and aack
trac. IP traceback is performed using the metric values for an aack sample detected by
the detection scheme. is approach uses a generalized entropy metric with packet inten-
sity computation on the sampled network trac with respect to time. e authors show
that ELDAT works well for detecting four classes of DDoS ooding aacks, including
constant rate, pulsing rate, increasing rate and subgroup aacks.
(12) Machine Learning: Reference [32] proposes machine learning to detect and mitigate known
and unknown DDoS aacks in real time environments. e authors chose an Articial
Neural Network (ANN) algorithm to detect DDoS aacks based on specic characteristic
features (paerns) that separate DDoS aack trac from genuine trac.
(13) Flow Correlation Coecient: Reference [42] proposes a discrimination algorithm using
ow correlation coecient as a similarity metric among suspicious ows. e authors
present theoretical proofs for the feasibility of the proposed discrimination method.
(14) Multifractal Detrended Fluctuation Analysis(MF–DFA): Reference [36] proposes the al-
gorithm of multifractal detrended uctuation analysis to explore the change in terms of
multifractal characteristics over a small scale of network trac due to low rate DDoS
aacks. rough wavelet analysis, the singularity and bursty of network trac under low
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rate DDoS aacks are estimated by using Holder exponent. e dierence values, known
as D–value, of Holder exponent of network trac between normal and under low rate
DDoS aack situations are calculated. e D–value is used as the basis to determine low
rate DDoS aacks. A detection threshold is set based on the statistical results. e presence
of low rate DDoS aacks can be conrmed through comparing D–value with detection
threshold. Experiments on detection performance have been performed in the test-bed
network and simulation platform. e extensive experimental results are congruent with
the theoretical analysis.
(15) FlowTrApp: Reference [7] proposes DDoS defense using FlowTrApp. Soware Dened
Network (SDN) provides a central control over the network which helps in geing the
global view of the network. FlowTrApp which performs DDoS detection and mitigation
using some bounds on two per ow based trac parameters that is ow rate and ow
duration of a ow. It aempts to detect aack trac ranging from low rate to high rate
and long lived to short lived aacks using an SDN engine consisting of sFlow based ow
analytics engine sFlow-RT and an OpenFlow controller.
(16) K–Nearest Neighbors trac classication with correlation analysis (CKNN): Reference
[38] presents a detection approach based on K-nearest neighbors trac classication with
correlation analysis to detect DDoS aacks. e approach exploits correlation information
of training data to improve the classication accuracy and reduce the overhead caused
by the density of training data. Aiming at solving the huge cost, the authors also present
a grid-based method named r-polling method for reducing training data involved in the
calculation.
(17) Matching Pursuit and Orthogonal Matching Pursuit algorithms: Reference [2] proposes to
use Matching Pursuit and Orthogonal Matching Pursuit algorithms for DDoS detection.
e major contribution of the paper is the proposition of 1D KSVD algorithm as well as its
tree based structure representation (clusters), that can be applied to detect low-rate DDoS
aacks and network anomalies. e method maintains the features of malicious trac in
form of tree to improve the classication performance and to optimize the implementation
in terms of time complexity.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented the classication and literature review of DDoS aacks. In spite of
scrupulous research over the years to mitigate DDoS aacks, they still exist today, in fact, with
larger intensities and impacts as there are dierent angles to consider. We also described some of
the commonly used defense mechanisms. Also, we presented a literature review of the defenses for
low-rate DDoS aacks that have not been handled eectively till today.
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